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Reification, Reanimation, and the Money of the Real*
Alessandra Raengo
This essay is an exercise in a form of looking from a distance. It is prompted by the desire to explore
the connection between two stunning objects, namely, Ken Jacobs’s Capitalism: Slavery (2006), a
digital animation of a stereoscopic card picturing slaves at work in a cotton field, and Nick Hooker’s
2008 digital video for Grace Jones’s song Corporate Cannibal.1 This is not an essay directly about Ken
Jacobs and even less about Grace Jones, but rather an attempt to show how, for me, these two
works belong to the same set. The set I am thinking about is defined by the intersection of three
(big) things: race, photography, and capital. The magnitude, but also the totalizing, all-encompassing,
and elusive qualities of such large-scale formations require necessarily an analytical and theoretical
gaze that beholds its objects at a distance. More precisely, these formations require a double look:
one that holds the object closely and another that is distant enough to observe formations such as
these that, in turn, travel the distance.
This essay is also committed to a broad theoretical move, which is simultaneously a stylistic one
largely inspired by these two objects—the movement of Jacobs’ animation in particular—as well as
others I will mention shortly: it is the desire to empower what is distant because it is tucked away. In
this particular case, I sketch out a visual theory from the inside out, that is, from the point of view of
race, rather than the more well-mined points of view of photography or capital. This move is
theoretical because it leverages what is usually understood as an object of inquiry—race, the black
body—as, instead, a lens and a location from which to look at capital and photography as objects; but it
is also stylistic insofar as it attempts to follow some formal characteristics I see at work both in
Jacobs’ film and Jones’ video: a pivoting move whereby the black body itself no longer performs as
the seen, but rather as a vantage point.
This is a move that Toni Morrison identified a long time ago in her close reading of the white
literary imagination.2 To be more precise, Morrison identified a missed opportunity, a denied
movement, which she critically corrected in her book and I am equally committed to making in this
essay by attending to the way in which these objects leverage the black body as a theoretical pivot. In
Playing in the Dark, Morrison describes the whiteness of the literary canon as the result of a process
of chocking what she provocatively called an Africanist presence. This presence manifests itself as a
tremor, a disturbance in the purportedly white literary utterance, which would like to deny it but
can’t, and therefore suffers a profound discomfort in order to accommodate for it. Morrison finds
and example of this presence in To Have and Have Not, where Hemingway maintains a black
character’s silence (a character his protagonist refers to with the N-word) by chocking his ability to
see. Having to describe that the black character at the ship’s wheel is seeing signs of an approaching
land, he writes, “I looked and saw he had seen a patch of flying fish burst out ahead.” “Saw he had
seen,” points out Morrison, is “improbable in syntax, sense, and tense but, like other choices
available to Hemingway, it is risked to avoid a speaking black.”3 The “virtual” pivot is here: in this
“distribution of the sensible” race is capable of performing on the literary utterance whereby we
cannot see the African-American character tilt his head and see.4 Incidentally, this syntactical detour
also indicates that it is relatively easy for the literary utterance to arrange for the black to be
speechless. Yet for the black to be sightless, unable to see and to effectively exist in the world, it
takes a veritable contortion. The sentence has to twist and turn and, in the process, abandon its
“search for transparency in the narrative act.”5 More poignantly for me, Hemingway’s sentence
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builds a twisted visual field, threatened from the inside by what it attempts to keep at a distance: the
presence of a silent and sightless black.
Capitalism: Slavery and Corporate Cannibal are objects that actualize the pivoting move—the African
American character’s movement of the head—that is only virtually present in Hemingway’s text and
which I would like for this essay to attempt to complete. Needless to say, this is a micro movement,
an almost imperceptible tilt, but one that bears large-scale consequences and thus requires a few
preliminary broad theoretical steps. I first begin with capital. Seen from a distance, capital outlines
what Giovanni Arrighi describes as an oscillatory history that moves through overlapping cycles of
accumulation, a longue durée he calls the Long Twentieth Century.6 Focusing on the moment of
finance capital of the British cycle of capital accumulation (1750-1825), in Specters of the Atlantic Ian
Baucom has argued that the transatlantic slave trade was instrumental to it.7 The change in the scale
of economic transactions occurring across the Atlantic and unfolding over much longer periods of
time made necessary a series of epistemological changes, namely the formation of what Baucom calls
an epistemology of “theoretical realism” whereby imaginative or speculative entities produced by
social agreement, such as the insurance value of a slave cargo, could be granted a “real” existence.
The implication of Baucom’s work is that, in the financial milieu of the Black Atlantic, race is a form of
appearance of capital because the African slave is a form of money. Just like the cycles of capital
accumulation move through commodity-based and speculative phases, so does the body of the slave
function as money differently at different times: in some cases the living breathing biological body of
the slave performs as currency (as in the West African coast where goods such as rum or firewood
could be “reckoned” in terms of a certain number of slaves) and in other cases it is the “virtual”
body that signifies “money.” What we find, therefore, is something that can be described as a virtual
slave body (i.e. the slave that is bought and sold virtually in the insurance contracts that covered the
slave ships or in the bills of credit issued to normalize cash flows at various stages of the
transatlantic trade) and an actual slave body (captured and loaded on ships in the West African coast,
transported across the Atlantic and then sold in the New World, or, as it happened in the case of the
slave ship Zong, thrown overboard so that the jettison clause of the insurance contract could be
appealed to seek compensation from the contract’s underwriters). Oscillating between the virtual
and the actual—or the symbolic and the embodied—the slave body ultimately provides more or less
material, more or less speculative forms of appearance of capital. The body of the slave is also tied
to different conceptions of time: it can represent a unit of currency or a commodity in the present,
but it can also offer an investment and, therefore, a financial return in the future.8
If the Long Twentieth Century can describe a longue durée in which race is a form of appearance of
capital, from the point of view of visual forms it describes another longue durée that I believe Jacobs’
film and Jones’ video make visible, one that I call the Long Photographic Century.9 The social uses
of photography in the 19th century have been described as a form of “money of the real,” because of
photography’s ability to function as a general equivalent in the realm of visual representation.10 I take
this expression seriously, as a way to think about photography too as a form of appearance of capital,
photography as a type of money.11 But what does it really mean to think about photography in these
terms, especially once one has decided to take seriously the idea that race is a form of appearance of
capital? Put succinctly, this means that photography too needs to be regarded as a form of appearance of
race. To make this point we need to think about photography from a distance that, just like
Hemingway’s African American character, is distant because it is in the inside. That is, we need to
think of photography from the point of view of the black body. We already know how the 19th
Century photographic practices reinforced the effect of the self-evidence of race and how the black
2
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body constituted the “perfect” visual sign in which the photographic effect and the race effect
mutually reinforced each other.12
Here, however, I am interested in pursuing a deeper and more specific connection made explicit by
Frantz Fanon who provides also some suggestions for a theory of what “photography,” in this long
and distant sense, might be. Fanon shows how blackness as a visual event is born and fueled by the
moment of photochemical fixation. In his notorious chapter on the “Lived Experience of the Black
Man” from Black Skins, White Masks Fanon links the moment of visual interpellation—“Look, a
Negro”—to the chemical basis of the photographic process. The Other’s gaze fixes him, he writes,
“the same way you fix a preparation with a dye.”13 For Fanon, photography describes an image-state that
fixates and fossilizes, a stance that, I contend, feeds a number of affects underlying Roland Barthes’
influential conception of photography as well, and therefore has been extremely significant in
ontological and phenomenological theories of photography.14 What this means, in this specific case
of looking in the distance, is that the way in which blackness is both imagined and rendered within
these longue durées is still tied to this photochemical imagination, to this imaginary fixation. In fact, it
keeps it alive across and beyond the digital divide. Furthermore, the focus on the moment of
photochemical fixation bears ontologizing effects not only for the black body that is thus fossilized
into a reified money-form, but also for notions of photography, whose essence is seemingly frozen
by the very act of pinning it to its indexical sign function.15 From an affective, rather than
epistemological or ontological point of view, and putting at a distance a lot of the discussion about
continuity and discontinuity introduced by digital imaging, “photography” indicates a technological
means of image production whereby we think we face something that is not yet the image, which we
want to fixate.16 In this sense, “photography” expresses many of the same desires and dynamics
already involved in our relationship to money, for example, the fact that money makes referential
claims but has no referential value. Rather, within the “inverted spectral ontology of value” Marx
employs in Capital, money is an abstraction that is factually real, even though not empirically so.17
Money, writes Jameson, is the reification of the relations it is supposed to mediate. Money does not
exist independently in the world; when we think we are facing it, we are actually looking at our own
shadow.
Thus, while I derive the breadth of my notion of photography from the scale of two formations it
intersects with, capital and race, I take the specific characterization of this intersection from Frantz
Fanon who expressed succinctly, effectively and precisely the relationship between blackness and the
affects and desires of a photochemical imagination, nurtured precisely by the type of body featured
in Jacobs and Hooker/Jones’s works. From this distance outlined by the oscillatory and recursive
history of capital and race—the Long Photographic Century—the longue durée that bolts race to
capital, capital to photography and photography to race—photography’s ability to act as a general
equivalent depends on the reification of its most accomplished mediation, the photographic object
that wears its money form on its sleeve; that is, the black body as black. From a “photographic”
point of view thus understood, Ken Jacobs’ flicker film and Hooker’s music video belong to the
same set because, even though both have profilmic bodies, in both the black body already is the
image. Even though one is originally produced within the 19th century pre-cinematic “frenzy of the
visible” and the other in the heart of the digital age, in both Capitalism: Slavery and Corporate Cannibal,
capital, race, and photography display their shared money form. In both, blackness acts as the money of
the real.
To describe Corporate Cannibal one is forced to rely on material and tactile metaphors. The video
begins with what seems like a diagonal strip of a fluid metallic black substance on a white screen,
3
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which quickly but delicately begins to pulsate. It grows what looks like an eye on the side, which
then morphs into a face, Grace Jones’s face, but only for a moment, before being absorbed by the
same black mercurial matter and being formed and re-formed over and over again. This shapechanging blackness is haptically rich. It is sticky, viscous, wet, slippery, thick. Shot in one long take
with two digital cameras the video has no clear cuts, no punctuation, no recognizably discrete
images, but rather unfolds as one fluid and continuous move. The only identifiable visual element is
Grace Jones’s face and upper body. Her song updates Marx’s vampire-like capital for the 21st
century, taunting her listeners with lyrics in which she unleashes cannibalistic desires. “Corporate
Cannibal/ Digital Criminal,” she sings, “I consume my consumers with no sense of humor.”
Jones speaks for the corporation but does she embody it? I hesitate to say this because the corporation
is historically an artificial person, but one that is deeply intimate with the biological body of the
slave. This is the intersection that Jones animates. The artificial person was constituted with the
Supreme Courte decision Santa Clara vs. Southern Pacific Railroad (1885) by leveraging the 14th
Amendment created to protect the rights of recently freed slaves. By lending her body to represent
the corporation Jones re-animates this intersection between the interests of private capital and the
formal recognition but de facto denial of the natural personhood of the slave. Therefore, her
cannibalistic desires do more than play on inversions between victim and perpetrator, container and
contained, consuming and consumed.18 Rather, these desires strike at the heart of one of capital’s
ontological scandals, the collapsed distinction between the artificial and the natural person as well as
the one that pertains between person and property. Jones’ own biological body reminds us that the
fiction, form, and notion of the artificial person that grants personhood to the corporation, hijacks
the legal space created to protect the recognition of the natural personhood of the slave. Even before
cannibalizing its consumers, the very legal personhood of the corporation has already cannibalized
the living-breathing body and the humanity of the slave.
Differently than Jones/Hooker’s video, Ken Jacobs’s Capitalism: Slavery features actual slave bodies.
It is a stereographic card retrieved at the Library of Congress during the conversion of paper prints
into 8mm celluloid. The video features a double photograph of cotton-pickers at work with an
overseer monitoring them on horseback. Jacobs has digitally animated it to activate its depth by the
rapid alternation between the two parallax views with the insertion of a black frame in between. The
result is a twisting, pulsating 3D force field in which the image seemingly moves, but does not
progress. The film is, in Jacobs’ own poignant words, “[s]ilent, mournful, brief.”19
While Capitalism: Slavery displays, in fact capitalizes on, clearly identifiable and discrete stuttering
movements, Corporate Cannibal makes a spectacle of the possibility of moving seamlessly. The alwaysmutating mercury strip in Grace Jones/Hooker’s video, instead, is seemingly unstoppable, unfixable,
and unbound like capital. When considered alongside one another, these two objects display the
collusion between race, photography, and capital by pivoting around two highly charged and
complex kinds of bodies, the slave body and the corporate body. Both bodies have a long and
distant history. Both bodies have a natural form and a money form, a biological flesh and a sublime
flesh. Thus, as much as their blackness is physical, it is also meta-physical, artificial, and, in a
Hobbesian sense, contractual as well.20 Both bodies have been at some point understood within the
framework of the medieval doctrine of political theology that Ernst Kantorowicz has described as
the “King’s Two Bodies,” a doctrine that also travels the distance.21 As Kantorowicz has shown, it is
a repurposing of St. Paul’s notion of the corpus Christi into a more flexible concept of the corpus
mysticum, performed expressly in order to explain the continuity of kingship beyond the mortality of
4
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individual kings. Because the natural (biological) body of the King is constitutively inadequate to
represent his kingship, his being produced the “abstract physiological fiction of a sublime, quasiangelic body, a body of immortal flesh that was thereby seen to enjoy both juridical and medical
immunity.”22 Thus medieval political theology posited that the King has two bodies, a body natural
and a body politic, a body mortal and a body artificialis. What is important here is that this is the dual
body Marx evokes in his discussion of the commodity form and Stephen Best argues inspires the
way 19th-century legal discourse grappled with the slave’s dual character—the fact that the slave is at
the same time a person and a thing, an object of property but a subject of sentiment, a monetary
value (in an insurance contract, for example) and a laboring tool (in a cotton field), immobile (like
real estate) but obviously mobile (and potentially fugitive) as well.23
To recap, money, says Marx, is the general equivalent. “General equivalent” is also the function that
the sublime body of the king performs in the politico-theological doctrine that Marx evokes to
describe the commodity form, and that Best argues inspires the aesthetic of slave law. What Jacobs
and Jones add to these series of connections is the suggestion that photography might have two
bodies as well, a body natural and a body politic, and that, by functioning as the general equivalent,
its sublime body is in fact the reification of the social relations that sustain it. In its reified form,
photography is like the blackness it fixates.
Money has two characterizations as well. In its reified form, money affords absolute stillness; yet as a
means of circulation, money never ceases to move. Capitalism: Slavery and Corporate Cannibal keep in
focus the distance between these two poles in two distinct and yet dialectically related movements,
flickering and modulation.24 Jacobs’ flickering foregrounds the temporality of recurrence, rather than
progress or linear development. The Hooker/Jones video on the other hand, presents a series of
variations within a limited set of possibilities.25 Both are oscillatory, like capital, but while the former
stutters, the latter flows seamlessly. Why?
In my title, I allude to this tension as the distance between reification and reanimation. It was Bill
Brown’s reading of Spike Lee’s 2000 film Bamboozled “Reification, Reanimation, and the American
Uncanny,” whose title I partly reproduce, which first brought this movement to my attention. I have
offered an analysis of salient theoretical moments in the film in previous and forthcoming work.26
Yet, I keep returning to it because of the rich theoretical work it performs on a multiplicity of levels.
Here I am concerned mostly with the exploration of the relationship between stereotype and
commodity form, in addition to the more commonly explored relation between stereotype and
fetish, and the relationship the film suggests between blackness and the profilmic.27
Brown’s reading of the film within the historical ontology of slavery that, he argues, survives in
visual and commodity culture, calls attention to the pivotal role of the black-faced “Sambo” artifacts
(cookie jars, salt and pepper shakers, piggy banks, and so on) that populate the film. It also
highlights how the film produces a theory of the confluence between stereotypes and reification.
These objects are obviously stereotypical and, as such, represent scenes of desire that are affected by
the dynamic of love and theft presiding also over the minstrel show.28 As household items, in some
respects these stereotyped objects foster proximity with the Other, whose surrogate body can be
touched and held, filled and emptied, in quotidian acts of hoarding and consumption. Yet, on the
other hand, they also testify to the seemingly unbridgeable distance between the other’s thingness
and their owner’s personhood. Additionally, these objects are also concrete and tangible products of
processes of commodification that first operate over the body of the slave. Supposedly modeled
after it—supposedly representing something that their makers and users believe they are facing—they
5
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fictionally exchange with the living body of the slave thanks to their shared blackness. It is their
blackness that secures the visibility of their commodity status, blackness that acts as their commodity
form. Thus, reification in Bamboozled is a way to describe the fixation of the stereotype in the realm
of material culture, which is where it acquires the “fortitude of solid form.”29 Reification is not only
a direct effect of capital but also a generative aesthetic principle within U.S. material culture.
Brown identifies a central tension in the film between reification and reanimation, between stillness
and movement, fixity and mobility, all aesthetic equivalents of a more profound flickering distinction
between objecthood and personhood. This tension comes to a dramatic expression in the scene in
which the Sambo artifacts assembled in Pierre Delacroix’s office reanimate and take revenge against
him.

Brown attributes to the photogenie and, I would add, the magical realism of Lee’s cinematography the
ability to make these objects seem to come alive, the possibility for their chocked inner life to come
through.30 In this moment the film stages “the recollection of the ontological scandal perpetrated by
slavery, as the reanimation of the reified black body… the ‘relentless objectification’ that reappears
as the personification of objects.”31

6
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This is a pivotal moment not only as a turning point in the film’s plot but because the objects that
initiate this narrative development themselves act as pivots. Rather than being silently tucked in the
depth of the visual field, here they seemingly turn around and look back.

They perform the movement that Toni Morrison saw Hemingway deny to his black character. They
take charge and, by asserting their position, they show the extent of the contortion and denial the
literary or visual utterance has to perform in order to keep them mute and blind. What becomes
visible in this movement is something that the stereotype, the fetish, and the commodity form
programmatically obscure, which is the ontological instability of these objects, the fact that they are
nothing other than a step in the process that consolidates the thingness, or (with Heideggerian
language) the “tool–being” of the slave. This is the movement that Jacobs’ digital reanimation stages,
as well. As we watch Capitalism: Slavery it is us who have to turn our neck, torque our vision, and
stutter in the attempt to restore what the photographic utterance had denied: movement, agency
and, ultimately, personhood.
But there is another reading of Bamboozled that is important here, one that emphasizes how the
system of objects in the film and the interplay of a variety of black surfaces show another aspect of
the money form of race, specifically the facility with which blackness is taken to express a
supposedly mimetic relation. Reification, in this other sense, describes the Fanonian moment of
(photochemically imagined) fixation. Like money and like photography, blackness too is not
referentially bound but still perceived as if it was. As it travels back and forth, a seemingly endless
chain of mimetic equivalences—between black skin, black-face, black paint, black people, all the way
to the Mau Mau’s idea of BLAK—Bamboozled also keeps their distance in play. This distance,
however, is not to be found between the representation and the represented, nor between the image
of the black and a profilmic blackness.32 The very idea of the profilmic relies on the assumption that
we might face something that is not yet the image, and I believe Bamboozled shows that this is not the
case. A gap, a distance between blackness and the image, needs to be sought, of course, but it lies
elsewhere. It is not in front of us, but to the side. The always-already-image needs to pivot, stutter,
and make us torque our vision in order for us to be able to see that mimesis is always only mimicry
and that our relationship with what we think we face is never frontal but is instead always oblique.33

7
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Jacobs’ film begins with a flickering image of a little girl, her head tilted downward toward her hands
full of white cotton. It is an image of suspension, subtraction, refusal. For an instant, she has
stopped her labor and seems to look at her hands—perhaps with puzzlement, perhaps with
exhaustion, in a gesture that temporarily subtracts her from the enforced rhythm of plantation
production. Jacobs’ digital reanimation creates the effect of a semi-circular movement to the right
repeatedly letting her come forth as that which the viewers’ gaze is attempting to circle around. The
image moves, but does not progress. This movement, which is repeated for other subjects in the
stereograph, most notably other three women, bears two important consequences. The first is
temporal: this is a movement that begins repeatedly but is never completed, thus it creates an
“illusion of movement disarticulated from time, so that […] time appears oscillating and elastic.”34
The movement, therefore, establishes a temporality akin to that of capital, which proceeds by
repetition, accumulation, and intensification.35 “The space I mean to contract,” writes Jacobs, “is
between now and then, that other present that dropped its shadow on film.”36 The second is a
question of agency: the sense that the photographed subject is in control of this pivoting movement,
which the viewer is condemned to repeat over and over again without ever achieving a visual
mastery over the scene. The observer can seemingly move around the cotton-pickers and yet never
quite do so. Spiraling motions begin but they are never completed. The image moves but does not
progress. Rather, in Adrian Martin’s words,
The constant, alternate shuffling from left to right, likewise, both heightens the illusion of
real space unfolding in a temporal move of the camera apparatus and frustrates it—by
always bringing us back, with a jolt, to the original staticness of the images.37
Through a series of oscillatory movements—first toward the left around the little girl, then pulling
back to show men working behind her, then cutting to women who are singled out and command
their own pivoting movement—the film eventually turns to the right and pulls back to offer
something close to an “establishing shot,” which reveals an overseer on horseback, with rifle in his
hand, watching over the slaves. The figure of the overseer offers a visualization of the plantation
from the inside out, what Nicholas Mirzoeff might describe as an instance of counter-visuality. 38
After having circled around the little girl, and yet not quite, we cannot see this overseer from a
position of mastery, but from one simple gesture of refusal and disruption, which, thanks to Jacobs’
reanimation, reverses the power relations of this highly charged visual field. Then, finally and
abruptly, the film cuts to the stereoscopic card itself, showing its two panels, their repetition with a
difference, thus suggesting that mimicry (not mimesis) might lie at the heart of photographic
reproduction.

8
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This repeated and yet never completed movement puts Capitalism: Slavery in direct relation with the
sequence of the revenge of the memorabilia in Bamboozled. Like Bamboozled, Jacobs’ film travels the
distance between reification and reanimation through the flickering effect obtained by its digital
manipulation. But it does so also in the way it negotiates its dependence on the physiology of vision
of the embodied viewer with the genre of the picturesque. While the stereographic card fosters the
involvement of the viewer’s body in the form of a prosthetic presence in the image, through the
illusion of depth, it also keeps it at a distance.39 It maintains the “segregation of the spaces,” to use
Christian Metz’s expression in an explicitly racial sense: it is the unequivocal separation between the
haptic space of the image and the body of the viewer that allows the stereograph to participate in the
genre of the picturesque.40 That safe distance between seeing haptically and being there keeps it
quaint. That distance is also what maintains the slaves in their role as purely visual objects—as
fixtures within a southern landscape that a photographic tradition continuing at least all the way to
the Depression Era Farm Security Administration archive has always portrayed as enveloped within
a metaphysical stillness.41 Removed from the realm of the picturesque and reanimated by Jacobs
now the photographed cotton pickers instead act as pivots. Just like the reawakened racist
collectibles in Bamboozled, they command close-ups, trigger movement and ultimately they turn the
very principle of their reification into a critical vantage point onto the system that reifies them. No
longer quaint or picturesque, the movement initiated by the little girl actualizes the move
Hemingway’s black did not get to make. Now its subject dictates the tone of the image digitally, and
compassionately, reanimated by Jacobs: it is indeed mournful.
This flicker effect is common in Jacobs’ work, but here I want to understand it in relation to his
decision to animate this specific object, rather than, let’s say, the Victorian stereoscopic photograph
of a 19th century factory floor in which children work alongside adults as Jacobs does in Capitalism:
Child Labor.42 In Capitalism: Slavery the constant oscillatory movement, the spatio-temporal
differential produced by the reanimation of the stereoscopic picture, the interval between the two
views, allows the picture to show its two bodies—its body natural and its body artificialis—and thus
dramatizes, as it peels them apart, the two bodies of the slave. Unlike Capitalism: Child Labor, the
stuttering of the image does not mimic the implied repetitive movement of the laboring hands but
rather resists the metaphysical stillness these subjects are nevertheless confined to by the genre
within which they are represented.43 The stereoscopic effect seems to be deployed mostly to suggest
depth, not movement. The actual movement, instead, needs to be restored by the act of viewing.
9
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Thus, it is the viewer’s visual strain that animates the object. The lack of progress and resolution
mimics not only the alienation of labor, which in the slave is taken to its most reified extreme, but
also the slave’s alienated person.
Because of the specific subject matter, Jacobs’ use of his patented technique of “eternalism” at the
service of the pivot created in Capitalism: Slavery bears larger and more profound implications. Jacobs
defines “eternalisms” as “unfrozen slices of time, sustained movements going nowhere […] without
a discernable start and stop and repeat points a neck may turn….eternally.”44 Following Jacobs’ own
description we appreciate the idea that eternalism offers an aesthetic rendering of the fact that
historical recurrence can have ontologizing effects: the ontological scandal of slavery is repeated
with each instance of alienated black labor, each time blackness functions as the commodity form.
And with each repetition, they continued to be reified.
Even more subtly and perversely, the ontological scandal of slavery is repeated also in each
corporate “person.” As already mentioned, the corporate person is the result of a leveraging of the
equal rights protection clause of the 14th Amendment, which was originally designed to safeguard the
recognition of natural personhood of the recently freed slaves. Arguing that artificial persons
deserve the same equal protections as natural persons, Southern Pacific Railroad attorneys allowed
the corporation to produce a body artificialis, akin to the sublime body of the king, so that its
interests could be successfully protected.45 This “germination” was not an isolated occurrence but
rather part of a systemic confusion between person and property—the afterlife of slavery in the text
of the law.46 As Stephen Best shows, 19th century law mobilized the notion of the “person,” as a
“sublime” extension of the figure of the slave. Before Santa Clara, in the Fugitive Slave Law (1850)
the fugitive slave is presented (implicitly) as a person because she is treated as a debtor. That is,
personhood is “extended” (in scare quotes) to the slave merely as a foundation of her obligation
toward the master. The slave’s “debt makes property appear in the form of personhood.”47
Intellectual property laws also relied on a similarly extended notion of “personhood” as a way to
protect property rights in “heretofore inalienable aspects” of the person.”48 Overall, concludes Best,
personhood is merely a textual effect; it is a form that the law “engenders” out of the archives of
culture, “one effect of the traffic between incarnation and figuration,” between a biological body and
a sublime body politic.49 As “the reification to which we assent as members of the body-politic,”
ultimately in 19th-century jurisprudence, the person is the reification of agreed upon market
relations.50
If in Capitalism: Slavery the two bodies of the slave are maintained distinct and put at a remove from
each other, in Corporate Cannibal not only are the natural body and the body artificialis conflated, but
their relationship is turned inside out like a glove. Corporate Cannibal gives the sense that one might
be touching, so to speak, the slave’s alienated sublime person. An entirely digital production,
Corporate Cannibal makes a spectacle of this reversal, even as it continues to rely on the blackness of
Grace Jones’s actual, embodied biological skin and on the intensity of her impersonations. By
impersonating the corporation, Jones takes back the “prosthetic body” that the figure of the slave
produced and was hijacked by the corporate person. In doing so, she embodies capital’s ability to
constantly mutate and adapt, abstract and extract.
Second, by challenging the distinction between foreground and background, between ambient and
figure, surface and depth, Corporate Cannibal problematizes the distinction between the image and the
profilmic, the black image and the black as image. Hooker’s video —entirely in black and white, or
only in black, as Shaviro suggests, since the whiteness behind Jones is merely an empty space behind
10
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her—begins quietly, with just one strip of mercury that cuts the screen diagonally. Part organic and
part metallic, it shivers softly at least until the first lyrics of the song, which coincide with a medium
shot of Grace Jones wearing a black suit with pointed shoulder pads, a vampire or the high priest of
an unnamed masonic rite: “Pleased to meet you,” she enunciates, “pleased to have you on my plate.”

The glow of her skin is so strong that its blackness looks like a reflecting metal surface. Blackness is
something fluid yet dense, an ever changing surface, and yet never simply just that: it cannot hold an
identifiable shape and does not have a distinguishable inside. Any cell, any particle can be moved to
the surface and then, in an instant, sink to the bottom, be absorbed and disappear. Yet the tilting
movements of Jones’s head remain recognizable, and so do her sideways glances, as well as her
menacingly direct looks. There are two identifiable distinct camera angles, one fully frontal and the
other slanted to the side alternating rather rapidly. A series of skewed reversals punctuates the song’s
lyrics: “You’re my life support, your life is my sport,” “I can’t get enough prey/pray for me.” The
imagery of cannibalism pursued by the lyrics evoking taboo bodily consumption is sustained
throughout the song: “Your meat is sweet to me,” she sings. “Corporate cannibal, eat you like an
animal.” At times she shakes her head like a ravaging animal pulling flesh from a rotting carcass
while the refrain grafts bestial allusions onto the imagery of industrial production: “I’m a man-eating
machine,” it repeats throughout.
As we hear the oscillatory structure of the lyrics’ rhetoric we can also identify two movements from
depth to surface and vice-versa. One is a movement whereby the profilmic and the image are visibly
conflated and Jones becomes, as Shaviro has noted in Post-Cinematic Affect, nothing but an electronic
signal whose modulation fills the screen.
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The other is toward a detachment of the image from the profilmic; this is when, suddenly, the image
becomes grainy and fuzzy, low-fi and we become aware of its texture and its “failure” to fully render
what it is an image of.51

These flashing images act almost as a return of the repressed in which the Grace Jones that stood
before the cameras reasserts herself as something other than the image we are looking at. Her
concrete corporeality cannot be undone. As much as her figure floats to and from the surface, at
times lost in an image that absorbs her, the facial expressions, the tilting of the head are hers, and so
is the movement of the wide-open mouth threatening to devour everything and anything.
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For Shaviro there is no profilmic Grace Jones but only “an electromagnetic field”: “Jones’s imaged
body is not a figure in implied space, but an electronic signal whose modulations pulse across the
screen.”52 Yet when recalling director Nick Hooker’s comment about capturing on a single long take
“the raw glow of [Jones’s] skin,” Shaviro also calls attention to the role of Jones’s corporeal
blackness and the fact that her profilmic blackness is seemingly already the image we are looking at.53
Just like labor, it is immediately abstracted from her body. Just like burnt cork, it is also seemingly
immediately fictionally extracted. To be sure, Jones’s profilmic blackness continues to reappear in
Shaviro’s text and Hooker’s statements as a wish for its own disappearance, a desired conflation of
the blackness of the profilmic subject with the blackness of the image. “It is true, of course,”
concedes Shaviro, “that Jones actually did stand before the camera, at one point in the production of
‘Corporate Cannibal.’ But the video’s ontological consistency does not depend, in the way that a film
would, upon the fact of this prior physical presence.”54 The video’s ontological consistency, for me,
depends on blackness as the money form and on the way digitality can underline this fact.
Understood here as etymologically linked to tactility, as Laura Marks argues in Touch, paradoxically,
in Hooker’s video digitality makes us touch the money form in new ways.55 “In the digital image,”
writes Peter Osborne, “the infinity of exchange made possible by the abstraction of value from use
finds an equivalent visual form.”56 Not only that, but in the digitized black image the infinity of
exchange finds an equivalent tactile form. When Grace Jones’s blackness, acquires the density of an
“oil spill,” the digital emerges not as a site of disappearance of the carnal body but rather as a site in
which the roles between the sublime and the natural body might be reversed. We finally “touch” the
sublimity of the corporate body.57
Ultimately, by staging a return of the slave body in the artificial body of corporation, the dense
blackness of Hooker’s video makes us touch the bottomless emptiness of the corporate person, the
fact that the corporation has “personality (but not a face), intentions (but no feelings), relationships
(but no family or friends), responsibility (but no conscience), and susceptibility to punishment (but
no capacity for pain).”58 An augmentation, intensification and accumulation of the pivoting,
flickering and stuttering moves either actual or virtual slave bodies have made throughout the Long
Twentieth Century, Grace Jones’s blackness offers a spectacle for the conflation of the image with
the profilmic and of money with the real. What we find is the denial, via absorption, of the duality of
form as a type of “seeing double.” The parallax views are no longer visible, our visual strain is no
13
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longer required, and the two bodies of the commodity, the slave and of photography have become
undetectable, while the digitization of a blackness that is conflated with the image, makes a spectacle
of the difficulty/impossibility to distinguish them.
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